Methodological issues in evaluating debt - reducing deals by Claessens, Stijn & Diwan, Ishac
Policy,  Research,  and  External  ,.flairs  ,*  (9r
WORKING PAPERS
Debt  and  International  Finance










I lere  is a  sinmpie  method  bor identifying  the best  debt  deals  a
CoLIntry can  haruain  tor \  ith its  creditors  \hen  debt  reduction
atnld new  nimney  are  thei only  (optionis  availalhi.  .4
"a.
I  P!:e  1  ,  R.  a7.'  I  V!.  I:(-  ,  :i'.'  k  I  Pi  a  ;o-  i-e'  . d: t  c  l:  C  Endings  of aork  in  prngncss

















































































































dPolic.r, Research, and EAternal  Affairs
*  5  5:1
Debt and International Finance
'I'his  paper  -a prodUCt  01  tle Ikbt  anll l  ncationajl  Iinance  IjrrivSji,  Intejlionll  L  onlom  icS D)pljt_-
IIrit  - i^ parl of a laIrgcer  e tIort In PR  F  to  s  taud tie respon1cs  kf  1tittller-cial  crcdiors  to difterini
deht  restrclturinu  deals,  >to as to  d,>ie  d  lik  hlciti  arc  l ore,  la\orablc  10r  the  COUtrII  . pIies:'
availabhle 1recl Irori  Oic \World Bank,  I 18  II  Stirctl NW'.  a'shistgtiltoni  )C(  2433.  Please contact  Sltci' di
Kin-W'atson,  roomn S  -0255 extcnsion  3373,0  (1  37  pagCs  w;ith  graphs  and  tables  r.
'F1ie  novel(r  c  111(t  complexity  of me'nu hased  dcbh  *  c  That (the nere existenlC o1f  ;1  aLisCoLunIt  on  llthe
reductioln  d]Cals unider  the  Brad  .m Iniiiati\e  make  sccondar\  market  is  a sulficienit  conlditioIn  for
it diiflicult  to see througcl  thc smolke  andl  rn  i roros  bu\haacks  that are proflitabIc lor  a debtor.
of'  financial  engineering.  Clacssenis  arnd Dmi;an
explain  thc  esscntials.  Drawing  oti  applications  in  Mexico,  Costa
Rica, aridl  tle  lhtlilippines, Claessens  and Diwan
ThCe Cxplalin  the buil(dillg blocs  for anal\/-  present a simple nietthodi  lor  identifying  the best
ing debt dcals, discuss comi  mon pi taltlls.  and in-  dcebt  dcals.  in temis  of dcebt  rceductioni  andl
trodluce thc corncept  ol' iteC deht  ValiUC  Curv  c.  I(iL'idit\.  a counltr  can hargain  lI'r  vith  its
T[hey  anal  vc  in  dctail  lthC  main  instrurnieits  creditors  \heIn  (dcbt reductionl  and  new.C  monev
available for debt reduction:  bu\ hacks: an  are thic  options.  1Thev  emphasize  that tic  pro;vi-
exchlallng  ot loreign  debt againsnt  another torciL  n  siori of nc  mone\  is best v ic\ecd  as a conices-
alsset  sittl  w  lilltd  relirent  tirms:  and anl xc1ha1nee  ol  sioni  h!  nion-c\xisting  creditors in cxclhange or
foreigni decht  against a (domestic  asset  (a  dlch-  tile  '  alileC  increazse  of  their existing dcht on
equit\  s5klf).  Tlite  delscribt hozs to puit  tlie  ac.count  ol tlic debt reduction.
diifertent  ccmntcs  or  u det.l  t'ctlirit  lo  Atr ij\  .At
a suital1e badlanc.  e  ct). Cn.  ecu  t  rc<ldi,iwu  ond  Nokm  tire challcriro  ik to idetllith  etc  deal that
liquldit\.  Anld  tle\  c  the iiW  11,:t of  euoi  is bcst  tor  tic  thecoulllr\ (ri\en  its  pir-cerenccs
lcndcrs on  deht  dIals.  rNl)ut hquldit\  \%er>SUS  dehbt  redICt6io1n  andi  La,t1.
I,ill  cc pt  ab'lI  to its  creditors,  That  \  ill
T'le\  crrphisi/t'  \k  o l>ci' in  \wltimtil%r  re,quire  ai  Leneral  cquilibnruilm  nacroecorrovrric
deht rdctl.40  t1or  dil\  model tO  ana\Iie'  a  cOulntr'S  illxcstlert.
gr  ox  tir.an  TL'repA\  it'S  lblea.  irla  rA  xlien1  tlir
'Iftll  t  oluillta  riallkelt  hb;t.u<cd  mt.eclurr1collisuntrx  har!  s ai orci-.ri credit  const:aiiint  ard  a debt
airc  akk  A'\ S good lOr  aill, The  ai1\ Urlle'C  0Ill  \ erhalg.  It  xxiii  AlSo  reLlul  re  a  tter  under-
Ilnarke t'l-ba;t'.cdl  ncIlarrti\rli'xl  '  tlr  ihex  ,ct  S;  ilKlill'di  u  1  oftox  aInkS  1make  a1  choice \A  hen
airouLndi  cOIlleCixC  eCact  ion  pr4!lcrrl  but  tl:x  r''u tc  \  xilh  .i  illr  oh optiorlo
dont tieco,-arr  lx bnfict'i oxe\ orekk.
\f  fai  r I CO  ''I  0.'  T  1  I'  I  ' '  . !  '  I  "  :  I  thX1 !i.!!.
)IIl  C.  t-In  . . 1  2  S  1  '  .r  I-.  i.  .'  I  1  1.  2  '  *;J2  *1METHODOLOGICAL  ISSUES  IN  EVALUATING
DEBT - REDUCING DEALS
Eoreword
This paper is  motivated by the  rise in  market-based debt reduction schemes
a,.d  the  official  support  for  debt  reduction  as  in  the  Brady  plan.  Both
developments require  a better understanding of  the different  types of debt
reduction schemes, their  essential  characteristics  and their  benefits and  costs.
The paper is  especially motivated by the  development of concerted debt reduction
schemes that combine debt reduction with new money.
The  paper builds  on earlier work  in the division and bridges the gap
between  earlier analyses of concerted new money  deals and market-based debt
reduction techniques.  Applications of the analysis to recent debt restructuring
deals demonstrate the relevance of the issues analyzed.2
METHODOLOGICAL  ISSUES IN  EVALUATING





Table  of  Contents
Page
I. Introduction  ...............................................  3
II.  Building  Blocks  ..  3
1. Instruments  ..........................................  5
2. Pitfalls  and  Fallacies  of Market  Based  Debt
Reduction  Deals  .....................................  6
3. Status-Quo  and the  Diverse  Interest  of  Banks  .........  7
4. The  Debt  Value  Curve  .................................  8
5. Involuntary  Lending  .................................  11
III.  Analysis  of the  Elements  of a  Menu  . . 12
1. Buybacks  ............................................  12
2. Senior  Exit  Bonds  ...................................  15
3. Debt  Exchanges  and  Collateralization  ................  17
IV.  Characterizing  the  Best  Debt  and  Debt  Service
Reduction  Deals  . . . 21
1. Dilution  Mechanism  ..................................  21
2. Debt  Deals  that  Maximize  the  Return  on
Official  Loans:  the  Debt  Reduction-Liquidity
Frontier  ............................................  23
3. Preferences  over  Debt  Reduction  and  Liquidity  .......  23
4. Other  Dimensions  of the  Deal  ........................  26
5.  Applications  ........................................  28
5.1  The  Recent  Mexico  Deal  .......................  28
5 2 The  Philippines  ..............................  31
5.3  Costa  Rica  ...................................  32
6. Seniority,  Prices  and  Buybacks  ......................  34
V. Conclusions  ...............................................  35
References................................................  373
METHODOLOCICAL  IS!'IES IN  EVALUATING DEBT - REDUCING DEALS
I. Introduction
The Brady Initiative has intcoduced official support for debt reduction.
This new phase in the debt strategy requires a new set of tools to analyze debt
deals and to study the impact of a deal on the debtor country.  Since debt
reduction as well as new money instruments  are now negotiated simultaneously in
a  partially concerted  environment, the  kind of analysis  will have to  be different
from  that  used  in  the  market-based  menu  approach,  where  debt  reduction
instruments  were negotiated with banks individually.
This  paper  discusses  first  the  methodological issues  involved  in  evaluating
the different  individual components of a  debt deal,  i.e. in a market-based
context, and shows that the evaluation can be reduced to a tradeoff in two
dimensions: debt reduction  versus liquidity.  The paper  presents next a specific
model to evaluate a debt deal consisting  of multiple components, i.e.,  new money
and  debt  reduction instruments.  The  paper argues  that  creditors  not  participating
in  any debt reduction free-ride on the increase in value of the remaining debt.
As a result, the debtor should be able to use debt reductions as a bargaining
chip to extract some concessions from these non-participating banks. This leads
to the important result that agreements more favorable to the country can be
reached when a deal, including new money and debt reduction, is negotiated in
a concerted environment, even when debt reduction remains market-based.
The structure of the paper is  as follows.  Section II presents the  building
blocks  for an  analysis  of debt  deals,  discusses some  common pitfalls,  and
introduces the concept of the debt value curve.  Section III analyzes in detail
the different instruments available for debt reduction: buybacks, senior exit
bonds and debt exchanges.  Section IV puts the different elements of a deal
together and derives a debt reduction-liquiditv frontier. This  section also
applies the  methodology to  three  recent  debt  deals:  Mexico, Philippines  and Costa
Rica, and discusses the impact of senior lenders, such as the international
financial institutions, on debt deals.  Section V concludes.
II. Building Blocks
The novelty and complexity of menu based debt deals makes it difficult
to see behind the smoke and mirrors of financial engineering. This paper will
simplify the  analvsis  by capturing the  essentials  behind menu driven deals under
the Brady Initiative. (For the essential features of the Brady initiative we
refer to the box).4
The  Brady  Initiative
The main features of the Brady Initiative are the following.  Debtor
countries are expected to  maintain (or  adopt) growth- and reform-oriented
adjustment programs. In addit.on, they should take  measures to encourage
repatriation of flight capital and foreign direct investment.  The IMF,
World Bank  and  other official creditors  will provide financial  support for
debt and debt-service reduction.  The debt and debt-service reduction can
occur through debt buybacks, exchanges of old debt at a discount for  new
(partly)  col.lateralized  bonds, and exchanges of old debt for new bonds at
par value, with  reduced  interest rates.  The  international financial
institutions will not  act as a party  to the negotiations ber.ween  the
country and  its creditors.  (Intervention by creditor  goverT7n"p-ts is
possible).
Over a three-year period, the IMF and the World Bank expect wo provide
between $20 billion and $25 billion.  Japan is envisaged to provide about
$10  billion  over  the  next  several  years  (through  cofinancing)  as
additional support.  Commercial banks will provide debt reduction and new
money, and support the accelerated :eduction of debt and debt service.
Creditor governments will continue to reschedule official loans through
the Paris Club and maintain export credit cover for countries with sound
reform programs.  Tax,  account ng,  and  regulatory  impediments to  debt
reduction in creditor countr; s will be eliminated.
The barebones of any menu driven debt deal consist of:
a new money instrument;
an  enhanced debt reduction instrument (buvback  or exchange);
loans  from  international  financial  institutions (IFIs)  that are
dedicated to debt reduction.
This barebones setup allows us to derive some lessons which are crucial
and to  characterize what type  of deal is  best  for  a  debtor.  A two step  procedure
is usel.
(i)  First, we look for the set of feasible deals which offer the creditors a
net payoff equal to the status  quo in  terms of expected net present value.
For this, it is necessary to identify the status quo against which the
creditors and the country compare any debt deal.  This also requires an
understanding of how banks evaluate different claims, in particular, new
money calls and exit bonds.
(ii)  Second,  we specify the  objective  of the  country in  terms  of two  parameters:
debt reduction--a  reduction in  the  present  value  of future  obligations--and
new  liquidity  to be  used  domesticall1  for  investment or  consumption
purpose'.  The  country  can always  achieve  more  debt reduction  by  sacrificingsome  current  liquidity.  The choice for  the  debtor  among the set  of feasible
deals amounts then to the rip't trade-off between debt reduction and new
liquidity.
Before  being able to identify  the right tradeoff,  we need to  develop some
tools. We will describe  first the basic  instruments of a menu  driven deal,
discuss some common misconceptions, analyze the pricing of debt--in order to
evaluate which  type of deals would  be acceptable  to banks compared  to the
perceived status quo payoffs--and analyze involuntary lending.
1. Instruments
Market based debt and debt service reducing transactions can be divided
into three broad categories: buybacks; exchange of foreign debt against another
foreign  asset  with  different terms;  and  exchange  of foreign  debt  against domestic
asset (debt-equity swaps). The instruments are described in detail in the  box.
2. Pitfalls and Fallacies of  Market Based Debt Reduction Deals
It is useful  to dispel first some common misperceptions  and fallacies
regarding market based debt deals.  We will concentrate on two.
A first  c-nmmon  fallacy is  that  voluntary  market  based mechanisms are  always
good for all.  While it is true that market based mechanisms by definition get
around collective action problems, and may therefore te advantageous, they do
not necessarily benefit all. A zimple example of how a market based mechanism
may backfire would be the following.'  Suppose a country owes a large sun to its
creditors  and  has an investment  opportunity  which, from  creditors'  point of riew,
is  very profitable as it  yields much  more than  their  cost of funds,  however, less
than the total  amount the country owes them.  Suppose also that the country has
some excess reserves at hand (or  has access to a loan from the IFIs), which it
can use for either the investment project or for a buyback.  Now suppose the
country spends its  reserves buying back its  debt on the secondary market. If the
country succeeded in  buying back debt, it  would make creditors worse off: to get
the reserves, they need to give up a profitable investment opportunity.  The
country  would also be worse off, since it  would have spent all current resources
(or would  have  reduced  current  consumption)  without  receiving  any  future
investment income.
Such a scheme would clearly be very foolish.  A concerted agreement is
unlikely to lead to  such a scheme.  The irony  is,  however, that this scheme could
be supported  by the  creditors under a  market-based menu.  The logic is that  each
creditor  would reason,  given that  other  creditors  are redeeming  their claims (and
therefore  the investment  project has effectively  been cancelled), that  his claim
would be worthless if he tried to hold onto them.  On  the other hand,  if he
redeemed his debt, he would at least receive some cash.  Thus, each creditor
would  reach  similar  conclusions  abou.  their  prospects  and  be  willing  to
tClaessens  and Diwan (1989)  mention this point. See also Claessens, Diwan,
Froot and Krugman (forthcoming).6
Debt  Reduction  Instruments.  Description
Buybscks: In this type of transaction, a country (Bolivia and Chile are
examples) buys back its  debt at  a discount in  exchange for a cash  payment.
But countries with debt  servicing difficulties rarely have much ready
cash, and therefore the Brady initiative envisions external support. In
case  of Bolivia  and Chile,  there were  exceptional circumstances  that
facilitated the debt buybacks (the  Bolivian operation  was financed by aid
agencies and Chile had excess reserves  because of unanticipated increases
in the price of copper).
Exchange of claims: An exchange of old debt for a debt  instrument with
lower principal or interest. In order for the exchange to be voluntary,
the  new  instrument must  be  a  more  secure  asset  in the  eyes  of  the
creditor. Three ~actors  can make new instrument more secure. First, the
banks can collec:ively agree that exit bonds have seniority over other
claims.  This,  however,  is unlikely to  occur. Second,  the  IFIs could
guarantee them. Third, the new asset can be backed by collateral for the
principal or  for interest payments, or  it can have  special conversion
rights.  In addition,  thLe  new  instrument can be  more  valuable  to  the
creditors because of certain tax, regulatory and accounting advantages.
To purchase the  collateral, the  country can  use it  own resources cr obtain
(part of) the resources from ocher sources--such as the IMF and the  World
Bank.
Debt Eguity swaps:Debl:-equity  swaps. An investor  exchanges a foreign loan
for  local currency  to be used  for domestic  investments.  If the debt
retired  is  public  debt,  the  government  effectively  prepays  debt  in
domestic currency, sometimes at a discount. Wh(  private sector debt is
retired (at a discount), the government loses (1, terms of cash flow) as
the debt service would have been paid to the central bank by the private
sector otherwise for later payment to external creditors.
participate in a buyback.  Of course, if the debtor would stand to gain from
investing (e.g., the return on the project exceeds the contractual obligation
to its  creditors), it  would not be in its interest to initiate a debt buyback. 2
This  demonstrates that  market-based  schemes  may solve  one collective  action
problem but do not lead to an optimal situation.  Letting individual creditors
choose what is best, without any collective guidance as to which alternatives
21n the context of the Brady initiative this question amounts to whether
the  IFIs should  restrict  (additional) funds  to be used  for debt  reduction
transactions alone or allow them to be used for investment also. If the IFIs
restrict the additional funds to  be used for debt reduction both the debtor and
the  creditors  could  agree  to  a  debt  reduction  scheme  even  if  there  exist
profitable investment opportunities in the country.7
are admissable, can lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes.  In the sequel, we will
analyze schemes that consists of a menu of admissible options which are (to a
large extent) agreed upon between the country and the creditors  collectively.
The design of the overall scheme is a concerted effort, but each individual
creditor is free to choose among the options.  At the same time the scheme has
to be in the interest of the debtor.
A precondition for a successful menu deal is that some mechanism  is in
place  to  guarantee  that  al'.  creditors  choose  one  of  the  options.  Free
riding--collecting payments without contributing new money or engaging in debt
reduction--has to be prevented.
3 If free riding is prevented, a sharing of debt
relief by all creditors can t.ake  place while the flexibility to accommodate
differences between creditors is preserved.
The second fallacy  of voluntary debt reductions is that the  mere existence
of a discount on the secondary market is a sufficient condition ior buybacks
which are profitable for  a debcor.  This view is  based on the  notion that, since
countries will need to repay their debts in full if they return to prosperity,
they are better off retiring debt when it is cheap. Such reasoning is flawed
however since  it does not  take into account the very  real possibility  that
debtors don't return to  prosperity--which is  exactly the re&son for the  discount
The Brady Initiative  has shown a reluctance on the part of creditor governments
to commit large sums of public money to buy back debt even though secondary
market prices are significantly below par.  This is a further indication that
a discount is  not a  sufficient  condition for  profitable  buybacks.  In the  absence
of a clear indication of either an upward or downward bias in secondary market
prices, we conjecture that they represent a fair estimate of the expected value
per unit of debt, in  which case buybacks are not necessarily beneficial for the
debtor.
3. Status-Quo and the Diverse Interests  of Banks
Even  though a  menu  approach  allows  for differences  among  banks,  the
determination of the  elements of a  menu, their relative  pricing, and the sources
of the funds  used to finance  debt  reduction remain  matters that  can divide  banks.
Divergence--between banks that want to exit and that want to stick to the new
money approach-  -imposes  restrictions,  since  under the  syndicated loan  agreements
each bank is iil  a position to veto contract changes.  Each bank must therefore
perceive that it is  equally well off  compared to the  alternative situation, call
it the  status-quo.  Other parties involved,  the  IFIs  and the  debtor country, must
also perceive that the new deal offers them at least  as much as the status-quo.'
3Free-riding can be limited in several ways: i) through legal mechanisms
(so-called  novation, see the  discussion of the 1989 Mexico deal, section IV.5);
and ii) through coercion mechanisms applied by the  IFIs  (such as condoning
arrears  to  creditors  not  participating in  the  deal) and  the  creditor governments.
4Expectations  of future deals will of course also matter. We assume that
the deals being analyzed are the  only ones expected for the foreseeable future,
or that they represent the sum of the future deals that are expected to take
place. Similar for the specified al.ernative.P
The constraints that follow from this are:
*  No individual bank should perceive that it loses compared to its
status quc.  Otlherwise,  the  bank could veto the  deal.  This implies:
*  Existing  banks  must  receive  at  least--in  present  value
equivalents--the value of their >'aims in the status quo.
*  Remaining banks providing new money payoffs must  receive a
payoff no lower than the status quo.  The gains  from  the
increase in secondary mnarket  price  (the result ot the debt
reduction) must  exceed  (or be  equal  to)  the capital  loss
implied by the provision of new money.
*  The IFIs must accept to fund (parts of) the debt reduction.
These constraints are not easily satisfied. Conflicts of interest are
likely to arise between exiting and remaining banks. Take the case where debt
reduction is financed  by resources that  were available for  de'-t  service.  A  bank
will benefit by exiting if the  price at  which it sells its  claims is  higher than
the perceived value of staying in.  However, if  debt is reduced the  benefits of
staying in and the price at which a bank will want to exit will be higher--due
to improved creditworthines.  But the higher  the exit price,  the less debt
reduction there will be, and  the less attractive the deal will be  for the
remaining  banks. Thus,  banks that exit  must do so at a price which is  considered
a bargain by the remaining banks.5  In case the IFIs finance the debt reduction,
then they must perceive that  the debt reduction leads to an  i.nprovement  in
creditworthiness of the country, which enhances the value of their claims, and
contributes to  some  of their  other  objectives (such  as  stability in  the  country).
Alternatively, consider the case  where the funds for debt reduction would
otherwise not have been available, e.g. foregone  domestic absorption or the new
external sources of the IFIs.  In this  case banks can exit at prices above their
status quo price while still allowing for gains for the remaining banks,  But
in this  case, part of the  benefits of debt reduction  has leaked to thne  remaining
lenders.  The debtor and the IFIs migh  refuse to participate in such a deal.
In  such  cases a  mechanism is  needed tha-  allows the  debtor  country to internalize
most (or  all) of the gains which are due to the reduction in debt, while at the
same time making no commercial banks worse off. The mechanism is to for the
cc.ntry to request from the remaining lenders current liquiditv in the form of
new money loans.
4. The Debt Value Function
The analysis of debt deals, requires a further understanding of how the
5This can be the case when some banks are more pessimistic  than others
about the future  prospects of the country;  when selling their claims, some  banks
enjoy larger tax  advantages  than  others; and  when some  banks' costs  of  monito-ing
their portfolios are too high given their small exposure.9
secondary market evaluates developing country debt. Conceptual models as well
as  empirical  observations  support  the  view--holding  everything  else
constant--tthat  the market value of debt ,alls short of  its face value at an
increasing rate as indebtedness increases.  This implies a decrease in the unit
price of debt as indebtness increases.
Several empirical studies have measured t'.e  relationship between prices
and face value of debt by estimating price equations (Claessens (1988),  Purcell
and Orlanski (1988), Sachs and Huizinga (1988), and Vatrnick  (1988)).  Some of
these papers use regressions of  the log of  price on the log of debt and other
_onditioning variables in the form:
ln(pit)  - a  - 9ln(D),t  +  IYt  +  fit  (1)
where pit  is the secondary market price  0,  is the total debt stock and Y,t  is
a  set  of  other  regressors  (such  as  measures  of  exports,  arrears  and
rescheduling), all for the ith  country ,n vear t.  The value of debt i.s  given by
V - p*D  - cD'-, where c is a constant related to  a  and Y in (1).  The coefficient
R provides the elasticity of  price with respect to the nominal value of  debt.
Typically, estimates of  1 are in the range .3<R<.7.
The specification in (1) is problematic because it forces the elasticity
to be the same at all levels of D. A better functional form for estimation is
the logistic form:
ln(pjt/(l-pit))  - a  - 9ln(D),,  +yYYt  +E.,,,  (2)
with the elasticity of price not restricted to be the same across countries.
Assuming that random noise separates the market price of two countries
with an equal debt burden, (2)  can be interpreted as an estimate of the average
debt value  curve across developing countries. The  elasticity of price  with
respect to debt is now a function of D and given by;  [c9D'-l'/[l+cDBJ.  Cohen
(1989) obtains  an  estimate  for  B of  1.2  for a  set  of  16 highly  indebted
countries.  Recent work by Claessens, Diwan, Froot  and Krugman (1989,  CDFK) finds
B-1.41  (and  a-7.88)  for  a  set  of  35  countries.
The  price  equation  used  in  the  text  is:
CDFK:  ln [p/(l - p)] - 7.88 - 1.41*ln(D/X)  (3)
where  X  stands  for  exports  (Data  set.  cross  sec  in  with  35  countries). 6
60ther  equations which  have  been  used  and  which  lead  to  similar  results
are:  Cohen:  ln  [p/(l-p)]  - 2.152  - 1.509*ln(D/X)  - 0.048*Xgrowth  -
0.583*Dummy(87.12)  Data  set:  pooled  equation,  annual  1986  and  1987  for  the  Baker
17  debtors.
Salomon  Brothers:  ln(p)  - 3.57  - 0.34*lnNDX  +  0.23*InPCI +  0.78*RP  +  0.47*Sl
+  0.16*DE,  where  X  is  exports,  PCI  is  per  capifa  income,  NDX is  debt net of
reserves over exports, RP - 0 if debt  has  been rescheduled, SI - 1 if interest
payments  are  up  to  date, DE - 1 if  a  debt  to  equity  program  is  in  place.  Data1.0
The  debt  value  function  associated  with the  CDFK  price  equation  is  drawn
in figure  1,  with the  market  value  v  on the  vertical  axis and the  size  of the
niomir.al  debt D on the  horizontal  axis (both  axis are scaled  by the  value of
exports).  The value  of debt is a concave  function  of outstanding  debt.  For a
given  change  in  nominal  claims,  the  associated  change  in the  value of deb- is
always  smaller  (as  long  as we.are  on the,upward  sloping  side  of the  debt  value
curve).
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Application  To Hypothetical  Country
The  secondary  market  price  for  an individual  country  will,  apart  from  the
level  of debt relative  to  exports,  be driven  by many  country  specific  factors.
To  apply  the  concept  of  a  debt  value  curve  to  a  specific  country  a  price  equation
including  more  country  specific  variables  would  need  to  be  estimated.  The.  price
equa:ion  listed  above  would  likely  not  be sufficient.  However,  for  analytical
and  illustrative  purposes  the  estimated  price  equation  can  suffice  as  it  captures
set:  1987-Q3  to 1968-Ql,  pooled  data (quarterly)  of Baker  17 debtors.15
voluntarily trade an average claim for the marginal value of debt, because it
does not want to pay for  Le  relative improvement  in the value of the claims of
those that do not exit.
The fact that a market based buyback increases banks' payoff above that
in the initial status quo and all the gains are  internalized bv  the debtor
country suggests that a market-based buyback is  best viewed as a concession to
creditors. However, the fact that the  debtor is  not able to internalize all the
benefits of a buyback does not imply that the transaction overall hurts him (or
benefits him): it  only implies  that there  might  exist  mechanisms that  would  allow
for larger gains (or smaller losses). A non-market based deal where a buyback
is  combined  with  concessions  from  the  creditors--in  particular,  with  the
provision of  new noney-  -could  be acceptable to  both the creditors  and the  debtor.
The cr.^ditors  group as a whole would receive the marginal reduction in market
value (AV)  for  t.  reduction in  debt (AD),  the group's  payoff  would remain the  same
as in the status quo, and the debtor would internalize  more of the benefits of
the buyback.
2.  Senior Exit Bonds
Suppose that the country car issue and sell off a new set of securities
called "secured  exit  bond", in  return for  outstanding  bank debt: a debt  exchange.
The critical feature of such a debt exchange is that the new securities be
accepted by the market as "senior" to original bank debt. By seniority, it is
meant that the  exit bonds will be paid before the remaining  claimants. Seniority
is critical in order for a debt swap to result in net debt reduction. Consider
what would happen if the new bonds were expected to be treated in the same way
as old debt. Then, the new bonds would sell at the same price as old debt and
an exchange would result in no debt reduction.
There are  some  practical  problems in  creating  senior  debt. In this  section,
however, we will assume that it is  possible to establish credibly the seniority
of a new debt instrument  which can be exchanged for existing debt. We will use
a simple indicative example to see how such a debt swap works.
Imagine that the country's $100 billion total external debt belongs  to
the an  identical "seniority class". Assume  also that the country will  with
certainty make payments in the future whose present value is $42 billion. The
implied secondary market price will thus be 42 cents. The country  introduces
now an exit bond with a face value of $1.  We assume that the new bonds are
expected to serviced in full first, i.e. the  new securit-y  is senior and will be
valued at a price of 1. Because the market values each dollar of original debt
at 42 cents, 1 unit face value of new bond can be swapped for i/(.42) - 2.38
units face vallue  of original debt.12
'2By conducting the analvsis for a small swap,  we can ignore the fact that
debt reduction will increase the ex-post price and that therefore, the rmarket
would value old debt given debt reduction at more than the original 42 cents.
In the case of large swaps, less thon 2.38 units of old debt would be retired,16
What is the gain from such a swap? The country has issued some new debt,
but has retired a amount of old debt which is greater, without using cash. The
net debt reduction is (about)  $1.38. What happens to total expected repayments?
In this case nothing, because the country made with certainty payments equal to
$42  billion, less than its  obligations.  The debt-for-senior-debt swap  would only
have lowered  the  price of  existing  debt, since the  new claim degrades the  quality
of original debt. But imagine, that there was a (very) small probability that
the country had more than enough resources to pay the debt in full. In such
circumstances, the debt reduction would benefit the country as the face value
of debt, and thus debt payments,  would have been reduced. The country would then
have reduced its  expected debt repayment  through  offering a one dollar  of senior
bonds, without using any current resources.
However, the scheme expiopriates the remaining  creditors, which would not
approve  it. Syndication  loan agreements  explicitly  include negative  pledge
clauses  that  prohibit  the  sale of  more  senior  claims. Unanimous  (or near
unanimous)  waivers  are  necessary  to  make  new  bonds  more  senior.  Existing
creditors will therefore not give any waivers of negative pledge clauses if the
swap is expected to hurt them.
But  how  can  one  then  comprehend  debt  reduction  schemes  such  as  the
Mexico-Morgan debt swap of 1988? We will argue that in the Mexico-Morgan debt
swap, no seniority  was created and since  Mexico used a cash collateral, the deal
was not much different from a simple debt buyback.
The 1987 Mexico Swap
In  December 1987,  Mexico invited  its  commercial  bank creditors to  exchange
outstanding commercial bank claims against Mexico for new bonds in,  what was to
be, the first major debt swap since the onset of the crisis. The new bonds had
a 20-year maturitv, with the principal, but not the interest, collateralized by
U.S Treasury obligations purchased bv Mexico using  its own  foreign exchange
reserves.  Mexi.co  was prepared to issue  up to $10  billion of the new instrument.
With a secondarv  market price of roughlv 50 cents,  Mexico hoped that $20 billion
of old debt would be retired.
Of course, MYexico  tried to convince the market that  the new debt was
senior. While  it was not able to obtain waivers in order  to establish  this
de-jure,  Mexican officials suggested  that  the  new  bonds would  be given a  de-facto
seniority, In  particular, they  claimed that the  new bonds would be exempted from
anv future restructuring agreement, and that loans exchanged for these bonds
would be excluded from the  base for anv future request for  concerted lending.  1
3
From  the  results  of  the  auction  it became  clear  that  the  swap  was
considered by the bidders as a collection of two transactions described above:
a (self-financed) buyback of principal plus a debt swap of interest payments.
It turned out that the interest payments were not evaluated differently from
3We will see later (section IV) that these exemption claims have become
common usage.17
regular Mexican  risks and were  discounted at  the same rate  implicit in the
secondary  market price.14  Evidently,  the  Mexicans failed to  establish seniority
for the  new  bonds, and their  debt swap  degenerated therefore into  a domestically
financed buyback  with  the  amount  of  resources  equal  to  the  value  of  the
collateral.
3.  Debt exchanges and collateralization
The major lesson of the Mexican-Morgan swap is that it is difficult to
establish seniority  beyond that implied  by the security  of a collateral.  We will
argue  here that,  as  a first  approximation,  all collateralization  schemes  are  more
or less equivalent and lead to the same amount  (net present value) of debc
reduction for a given amount of resources.  We will then list the circumstances
for which this may not be true.
Debt exchanges that are partially collateralized (principal or interest
or  both) can be decomposed into  a  buyback and an  uncollateralized debt exchange.
What matters to the  creditors is  the total  current  value of the  collateral rather
than how the collateral is allocated across principal or interest, i.e.,  how it
is spread out over time. However, there are situations in which this does not
hold.
The equivalence of different collateralization schemes to the creditors
can be expressed as:
Value (collateralized  bond) - Value (collateral)  +
Value (old  debt evaluated at post deal prices).
The  creditors are interested in  the total current  value of the  collateral
that is  backing each $1 face  value of bonds. The larger the current value of the
collateral, the larger is fraction of "implied"  buyback in the exchange.
'Using the interest rate at that time, the value of the collateral was
equal to 21.7 percent of the face value of the debt. The present value of the
contractual  interest  obligations  was  94.32  percent.  Since  other,
non-collateralized Mexican debt  was selling for  50  percent, the  expected present
value of interest  payments  was 43.65  cents. The total  value  was thus 21.7 + 43.65
is 65.35 percent, implying that $1.31 of old debt would be exchanged for $1 of
bonds  (an exchange  ratio of  1.31). A  price  above 65.35  percent would  have
indicated that the market accepted some of Mexico promises for seniority. Of
course, if the new bonds were considered fully senior, they would have sold for
a price of almost one dollar.
In  exchange for the $3.665  billion in face  value of debt  which offer price
exceeded Mexico's minimum acceptable price, $2.557  billion of the  new  bonds were
issued, backed by $492 million in collateral. Taking account of the fact that
the interest rate on the new bonds exceeded bv  a small margin  that on  the
exchanged  bank debt, the  transaction  turned  out to  have reduced the  present value
of Mexican obligations by almost the same amount as would have been achieved by
a straight buyback using an amount of reserves equal to the collateral cost.18
The  fact  that cred'Itors  are  indifferent  between various possible
collateralization  schemes  involving  the  same  total  current  value  of  collateral,
does not imply that the country  will be indifferent  too between different
schemes.  For instance,  if the  country  is more impatient  that the creditors
(i.e.,  its  rate  of time  preference  is  higher  than  the foreign  interest  rate),
or if the countrv has better investment  opportunities  (i.e., its marginal
productivity  of funds  is  higher  than  the  world  interest  rate),  then  the  country
can have a preference  for collateralization  schemes that lead to a higher
reduction  in  debt  service  early  on.15
The "implied"  buyback  equivalence  proposition  is easily  illustrated  in
terms  of a constant  probability  of default  model.  Consider  a creditor  holding
$1  of  debt  with  a risky  interest  pavment  r for  T  periods  and  a  sure  $1  repayment
at  maturity.  Assume  that  in  each  year,  the  debtor  is  expected  to  default  on the
risky  debt--and  pay  nothing--with  a  probability  (1  - 7).  Assuming  a  risk  neutral
market,  this  claim  would  be valued  at:
T
p - Value (Debt)  - 2  rn/[(l+r)tl  +  [l/(l+r)T]  (7)
t-l
Now consider  a new  bond  BI  which  interest  payments  of $r in  all  periods,
with  the  I  first  payments  secured  by  a  collateral  (zero-coupon)  and  the  remaining
(T-I)  repayments  unsecured.  This claim  will  be valued  at:
I  T
Value(B,)  - Z  r/(l+r),  +  E  rn/[(l+r),]  +  [l/(l+r)TI  (8)
t-l  t-I+l
The value  of the  risky  debt and the  bonds  BI  are not equal.  The bond BI
pa,-s  a sure  amount  r in  periods  t  - 1,2..I,  while  the  risky  debt  pays in  these
periods  with  probability  n. The  bond  will  be more  valuable  than  the  risky  debt
and  can  be exchanged  for  a larger  face  value  of risky  debt.  The  exchange  ratio
between  the  debt  claim  and  the  BI  bond,  61,  can  be defined  as: 15
6¾  - Value (Debt)  /  Value (B 1)  (9)
Two  particular  collateralization  cases  are  of particular  interest:
(i)  With no collateral  (I  - 0),  Bo is identical  to risky debt and
therefore  So  - 1.
(ii)  With complete  collateralization  (I-T),  Value(BT)  - 1.  As result,
6T  - p,  the price of the unsecured  debt. Therefore,  a complete
"5In  fact,  the  debtor  mav prefer  to  use  the  funds  for  immediate  consumption
or investment  if that  were  allowed.
16We  also  define  B  as the  share  of collateral  in  the  total  value  of  a bond
(see  tables  3a  and 3b).  This  concept  will  be used  more in  part  IV.19
collateralization is equivalent to a buyback.
Example of Collateralization
The probability of default at each period (1 - x)  is 0.4. Take a
debt claim of $100 which matures in 30 years, where for simplicity, it is
assumed that the principal repaid for sure in 30 years. Assume the debt
claim is swapped for a bond BI  that has a coupon rate of 10% and on which
the first Ilh  payments are secured through a collateral. The principal
$100 is also assumed to be repaid for sure in the 30th  year. We compute
the cash price of BI, its exchange ratio and the present value of the
needed collateral (table 3a). Note that full collateralization (I-30) is
equivalent to a buyback. Under all collateralization schemes, the amount
of debt reduction per unit of collateral (netADj/V(C 1))  is the same and
equal  to that of a buyback. Cash  flows involved may  differ, but  the
present value of debt service reduction achieved will be the same.
Table 3a
Collateralizing the First I Payments
I - 0  1  2  5  10  20  30
V(F)  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73
V(CI)  0.00  9.09  17.35  37.90  61.44  85.13  94.26
V(NCI)  37.70  34.0  30.76  22.54  13.12  3.65  0.00
V(BI)  43.43  48.89  53.85  66.18  80.30  94.51  100.00
SI  1.00  0.88  0.80  0.65  0.54  0.45  0.43
netAD,  0.00  12.56  23.97  52.36  84.87 117.59  130.21
netADI/V(C 1)(%)  1.38  1.38  1.38  1.38  1.38  1.38
B  0.13  0.30  0.43  0.66  0.84  0.96  1.00
Notes:
V(F) is the present value of the terminal repayment.
V(Cj)  is the present value of the I collateralized payments
V(NCI) is the expected present value of the (30-I) non-collateralized
payments.
V(BI) is the cash price of a bond with I collateralized payments
6I is the exchange ratio, V(Bo)/V(BI)
netAD, is the percentage net debt reduction, (1/6,  - 1)
netADI/V(CI)  is the  percentage net debt reduction  per unit of collateral
B is the share of the bond value derived from the collateral.
An example (in the box) shows that any collateralization scheme produces
the  same  amount of  net  debt reduction  per dollar  of  collateral. Collateralization
of a  bond does not lead to any leverage in terms  of the amount of debt reduction
achieved per unit of collateral compared to a buvback. It is irrelevant for the
creditors which repayments the collateral supports: only the present value of
the  collateral  matters.  Collateralization  simply  amounts  to  a  prepayment20
(buyback)  of a  specific  maturity.  Given  that  all  maturities  were  expected  to  be
serviced  with equal probability,  there is no added value to any particular
collateral  scheme.
However, this equivalence  result holds only when che probability  of
repayment  is  constant  over  time.  It  may  however  be plausible  to  argue  for  other
probability  distribution.  For  example,  suppose  that  the  probability  of  repayment
is  negatively  affected  by the  face  value  of the  remaining  debt.  Then retiring
early  maturities  would increase  the  probability  of servicing  later  claims  and
could  be  beneficial.  Also,  when  good  investment  opportunities  exist  but  liquidity
is  scarce,  the  prepayment  of early  maturities  would  create  value.17  Thus,  a  case
by case  analysis  is generally  required.
Lamdany  and Underwood  (1989)  use alternative  repayment  models  and show
that, even though  some differences  in the amount  of principal  and interest
reduction  exist  between  buybacks  and (different  forms  of) debt exchange,  the
present  value  of debt service  savings  is largely  invariant  for  a given  amount
of  resources  used (and  for  reasonable  discount  rates).  They  also  provide  cases,
where  the  timing  of  collateralization  becomes  important.  For example,  table  3b
present  one  example  where  the  probability  of  repayment  declines  exponentionally
over time.  As one can observe,  the amount  of debt reduction  per dollar of
collateral  increases  substantially  as  payments  further  in  the  future--those  less
likely  serviced--get  collateralized.18
17See  Claessens  and  Diwan  (1989)  for  a discussion.
1 8To  be  exact,  the  marginal  debt  reduction  per  added  maturity  collateralized
is  equal  to  the  marginal  decrease  in  repayment probability,  i.e.,
d[net,a  D/V(C,)]/dI-  -dx/dI.21
Table  3b:  Collateralizing  the  first  Ith  Repayments
........  ......  ................  ..  ..  ..........................  ..
I  - 0  1  2  5  10  20  30
V(F)  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73
V(CI)  0.00  9.09  17.35  37.90  61.44  85.13  94.26
V(NC 1)  37.7  29.80  23.55  11.62  3.56  0.31  0.00
V(B 1)  43.44 44.62  46.64  55.26  70.74  91.18  100.00
61  1.00  0.97  0.93  0.79  0.61  0.48  0.43
TietAD,  0.00  2.71  7.3s  27.19 62.83  109.87  130.18
net&D/V(CI)  NA  0.30  0.42  0.72  1.02  1.29  1.38
0  0.13  0.33  0.50  0.79  0.95  1.00  1.00
NPV  0.00  1.42  3.84  13.88 30.95  51.26  58.83
NPV/col  0.00%  5.77% 6.11%  8.24%  10.77% 13.04%  13.81%
Notes:  As in table  3a.  NPV stands  for the  net  present  value  of
savings  at a discount  rate of 15%.  NPV/col  stands  for the net
present  value  of savings  as a percentage  of the  amount  used for
collateralization.
IV  Characterizing  the  Best  Debt  and  Debt  Service  Reduction  Deals
We  will  consider  here  the  case  where  the  IFIs  make  available  to  the  country
some  loans  that  have  to  be  used  for  debt  and  debt  service  reductions.  The  country
subsequently  negotiates  with its creditors  over different  debt and debt and
service  reduction  options  and amounts  of new money.  This section  presents  a
simple  methodology  to determine  the set of new liquidity  and debt reduction
combinations  which  leave  the  creditor  banks  indifferent  to  the  status  quo.  These
combinations  represent  the "best" the country can hope to get out of its
bargaining  with the  creditors.  We then  discuss  how the  debtor  country  might  be
able to determine  the combination  of new liquidity  and debt reduction  that
maximizes  its  own  welfare.
1.  Dilution  Mechanisms
When  a debtor  country  uses  some  cash  to  buyback  its  commercial  bank  debt,
and  the  buyback  is  publicly  announced,  the  price  of  debt  will  rise.  All  creditors
will  gain  and  less  debt  reduction  will  occur.  More  debt  reduction  would  have  been
possible  if some  way could  be found  to buy  back debt at prices  closer  to the
pre-deal  price.
One way to do this is to ask the remaining  creditors to give some
concessions  to offset the.r  gains from the increase  in the price of debt.
Necessary  to  make  this  feasible--without  using  coercion--is  that  free-riding  is
precluded:  either  a  bank  participates  in  debt  reduction  (buyback)  or it  provides
a "concession".  We will define  providing  extra-new  money  as a concession.22
NOTATION
D  - total debt
C - extra cash from official lenders to be used for
buybacks
L - liquidity used for domestic purposes
N - extra-new money
C+N-L - amount used for buybacks or collateralization of
exit bonds
a - share of total debt D that will be choose between the
elements of the menu (aD is the base)
R - share of value of the exit bond that is
collateralized ((1-R) is thus the share of the
exit bond which is exempt from new money calls)
6  - the exchange ratio of old debt to the new bonds
n - new money call as a percent of exiting debt
AD - Debt reduction
ADnet - Net Debt reduction (We use AnetD - (N +  C - L)/(l +5*9  - 6/5*6]
- N - C; and the base left over for providing new money - a[D -
(C +  N - L)/ 6*9]).
p - ex-post price
q - alternative price or ex-ante price
When remaining banks provide new money (in the amount N), they will not
lose  compared to the status quo if the immediate  capital loss involved with the
extra new money loans they provide, (1 - p)*N, is not larger than the capital
gain,  Ap, on their existing  exposure. Remaining  banks are in  effect "taxed"  with
a new money call in order for the  deal to  be no-more desirable than the no-deal
situation.
Extra new money has  two effects: it lowers the buyback price--because
indebtedness  increases--and  it  increases  the  resources  available  for  debt
reduction. It will thus lead to an increase in the amount of debt reduction.
However, the extra new money can be used not only for debt buybacks, but also
for domestic  needs (consumption  or investment). 1 9 The more new money is  used for
liquidity purposes the less debt reduction will result.
As an illustration,  cornsider  the situation where D - $100 billion, C - $8
billion (C is the new loan made available by the s for debt reduction) and the
19When  this amount is large, an attempt should be made to integrate in the
analysis the effect of the increase in domestic investment on creditworthiness
and, thus, on the debt price.27
Table  5. Effect  of the  Base
($  billion)
a  .3  .4  .5  .6  .7  .8
N  .6  1.2  1.8  2.6  3.6  4.9
n  4.6  5.1  5.7  6.5  7.6  9.1
p  44.8  45.1  45.4  45.8  46.4  47.1
AD  15.7  17.0  18.5  20.3  22.7  25.8
AnetD  7.1  7.8  8,7  9.7  11.1  12.9
Notes. B-1, L-2, C-$8 billion,  q-42.3;  other  variables  are set as in
table  1.
lower  exchange  ratio  6.  When f  - 1,  the  new  bond is  completely  collateralized
and  the  exchange  is  equivalent  to  a  buyback.
Table  6. The  Effect  of Leveraging  a Debt  Exchange
($  billion)
9  .25  .4  .5  .75  1
N  .7  1.2  1.4  1.7  1.8
n (percent)  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7
p (cents)  45.4  45.4  45.4  45.4  45.4
aD  37.5  28.7  25.5  20.9  18.5
AnetD  8.6  8.6  8.6  8.6  8.6
5  71.6  62.9  58.2  49.0  42.3
Notes: a-.5,  L-2,  C-$8  billion,  q-42.3;  other  variables  as
in  table  1
Effect  of Alternative  Status  Quo
The  higher  the  status  quo  price  q (the  reservation  payoff  that  the  banks
must receive),  the less  net debt reduction  a certain  amount  of resources  can
accomplish.  The  lower  q, the  better  the  combination  of  debt  reduction-liquidity
the  country  can  get. Table  7 shows  some  sensitivity  scenarios  with respect  to
the  status  quo  price  q:  the  amount  of  new  money  the  banks  are  willing  to  provide28
under  the  debt  deal  decreases  dramatically  with small  increases  in q.
Table  7.  The  Effect  of  Alternative  Status  Quo
($  billton)
q  40.0  41.0  42.3  44.0
N  3.4  2.8  1.8  .3
n (percent)  12.7  9.6  5.7  .8
p (cents)  46.8  46.2  45.4  44.4
AD  23.4  21.4  18.5  14.3
AnetD  12.1  10.1  8.7  6.0
Notes:  a-.5,  L-2,  C-$8  billion,  9-1;  other  variables  are set
as in table  1.
5.  Applications
5.1  The  Recent  Mexico  Deal
The  recent  Mexico  deal  is  described  in  deLail  in  the  box. On 13  September
1989,  it  was  announced  that  a final  agreement  was  reached.  An important  part  of
the  agreement  was  a  paragral which  stated  that  the  conversion  of  the  base  debt
into  new instruments  throug debt  exchanges  would  explicitly  constitute  a new
contract.  The intention  of this  clause  was  to  imply  that  the  new  contracts  would
no longer  be subject  to the  sharing  clauses,  could  thus  receive  payments  which
did not need to be shared  with other creditors  and would reduce (or even
eliminate)  the problem of  free-riders.  This and some pressures  of creditor
governments  appeared  in  the  end  to  be  adequate  mechanisms  to  ensure  that  (almost)
all  creditors  were coerced  into  choosing  one  of the  option  available.29
Mexico Agreement
Mexico  and  the steering committee of  its creditor banks  reached an
agreement on July 23 on a debt restructuring  package. The package covers
about  $52.7  billion  in  medium-term  and  long-term  debt.  It  offers
commercial banks a menu of three options:
(i) a discount bond: a 30 year bond with a discounted principal of 65
percent of the face value of existing debt and an interest rate of LIBOR
plus 13/16 percent;
(ii) a par bond: a bond with no discount but a low interest rate of 6.25
percent fixed for the lifetime of the bond; and
(iii) a  new money  commitment:  7 percent  of principal balance  at  the
conclusion of the agreement and 6 percent in 1990, 1991 and 1992, at an
interest rate of LIBOR plus 13/16 percent.
The principal of both bonds is  guaranteed through the  collateralization
of a 30-year zero-coupon bond (US-Treasury or its equivalent in case of
other currencies). Both  bonds are  not subject to  the sharing clauses  which
are standard in most syndicated loan agreements.In addition, both bonds
include a recapture clause which stipulates that, in case the oil-price
increases by a certain percentage in the years 1997 and.  beyond, that the
creditors share in the increased revenue stream. The recapture clause is
capped by an amount equal to 3% of the amount of debt exchanged for the
two bonds.  The agreement also contains a contingent financing facility
in case of a decline in oil price. The  agreement further specifies a
certain number of relending  options and a debt-for-equity swap  program of
at  most  $1  billion  per  vear.  The  agreement  was  accompanied  by  the
announcement that up to $400 million would potentially be available from
the IMF under CCFF arrangen.ents.
Depending on the amounts of debt brought under each option, at least
18 months and at most two years of interest payment is guaranteed on a
rolling  basis through  an escrow  accou1nt.  The escrow  account is  establishied
using the  additional firancial  support  provided  by the  Bank, the  Fund,  and
Japan and from Mexico's own resources. In total an amount of $7 billion
's  used for debt and debt service reduction. Funding comes from the  World
Bank, IMF, and  Japan ($5.3  billion), and from  Mexico's own reserves ($1.7
billion).
Banks  choose  among  the options  in the  fall of  1989 and  the  final
outcome, announced in January 1990, is that out of the $48 billion of
bank debt covered by the agreement, 41% will take the  principal reduction
bonds, 49% the interest reduction bonds, and 10% will provide new money.30
Evaluation  of the  deal 23
The structure of the deal ensures that banks were coerced to choose one of
the options and that non-exiting banks have to contribute with new money, i.e.
free-riding has been eliminated. The base debt that had to be divided between
the three instruments was relatively large, about half of the total debt was
included.  One interesting  aspect of the deal  was that the relative prices of the
three options  were  determined  in  the  steering  committee  rather  than  in  a
competitive fashion.  24
Using our debt value function, we calculate the status quo debt price at
q - 38.3 (a debt to export ratio of 107/28). The two exit instruments are of
about equal value, slightly above 38.5 cents per dollar of debt. Banks will
choose between the two on the basis of their tax, regulatory and accounting
regimes. The  bonds  derive  roughly  39  percent  of  their current  value  from
collateralization.25
Analysis:
We set L - $1.1 billion and, given a, R, q and C - $5.3 billion, find the
amount of new money that leaves the  banks indifferent  between the discount bond
and a one year extra new money call. Our analysis predicts then an extra new
morney  amount N of $2.82 billion, an exchange ratio for the discount bond 6  of
62.4 percent and that Mexico uses $1.7  billion of the new money for the purpose
of debt reduction,  which together  with the $5.3  billion from tbe  World Bank, the
IMF and Japan, sums up to a total of $7 bi'llion.  A total of $34 billion would
theni  be exchanged for new  bonds, leading  to a  net debt reduction  of $11.7  billion
and a remaining commercial  bank debt stock  of $18.7  billion. The extra  new money
requirement is predicted to be n - 14.4 percent. The total predicted new money
requirement is then 17.5  percent. 26 After the deal is completed, the  debt price
is expected to rise to p - 41.6.
23The evaluation of the Mexico was done before the final choices of banks
were known (January  1990).  The evaluation of this and  other deals should largely
be viewed as illustrations  of .he concepts discussed before. The fact that the
results predicted fare well with reality should not be overemphasized as the
model itself is onlv rudimentarv.
24A  reason that may have plaved a role in this is that US regulators can
oblige banks to reserve against claims according to price bid.
25The current value of a bond with a face value of $100 consists of three
parts:  (1)  the  current  value  of  the  two  collateralized  interest  payments
($16.29); (2) the current value of 28 risky interest payments, evaluated at the
ex-post  price  ($35.74); and  the current value  of  the principal  collateral
($6.94).  The total  value of the  bond is  $58.97 and  R, the  value of the  collateral
divided by the value of the bond, is 39 percent.
26This is computed as follows. A  was 0.7 in the last new money agreement,
i.e.  banks expected to refinance 30 percent of the interest  bill or 3.1 percent
of their debt. Adding the extra new monev call (14.4  percent) to this we get a
total new money call of 17.5 percent.31
The  actual  distribution  over  the  different  options  became  known  in  January
1990.  The  base  debt  turned  out  to  be $48.4  billion,  of  which  10%  choose  the  new
money  opticn,  49% the  par  bond  and  41% the  discount  bond.  Total  amount  of debt
reduction  (including  the  present  value  of  debt  service  reduction  of  the  par  bond)
was $15 billion.  It looks like the Mexican deal is not far from the debt
reduction -liquidity  frontier.  The  analysis revealed that the new  money
requirement  negotiated  (25  percent)  was  too  high  to  be  attractive.  This  may  well
explain  the  lack  of success  of the  new  money  call  and  why  more  banks  cpted  for
the  debt  and  debt  service  reduction  instruments.  The  secondary  market  price  for
Mexico  was 39.75 in late February,  significantly  above the levels  prevailing
before  the  deal  was  finalized,  in  line  with  our  prediction.  One  important  problem
with the deal is that it did not specify exactly  how to divide the exit
instruments  if  they  were  over-subscribed,  a likely  pos3ibility  given  the  slight
mispricing  that  seemed  to  have  occurred.
5.2  The  Philippines
Annther  country  that  reached  agreement  in principle  with its  commercial
banks  and  that  received  official  support  for  debt  and  debt  service  reduction  is
the Philippines.  The Philippine  deal is described  in detail in the  box.  On
October  12,  the  Governor  of  the  Central  Bank  announced  that  the  Philippines  would
Philippine  agreement:
The Philippines  antiounced  on  August  15, 1989 that it  had reached  an
agreement  in  principle  with its  banks.  The  agreement  stipulated  that  the
Philippines  would issue "new money" bonds with the following  terms:
maturity  15 years,  grace 8 vears,  spread  13/16  percent  over US-dollar
6-months  LIBOR.  The  bonds  would  not  share  equally  with  existing  commercial
bank  debt  and  the  Philippines  would  covenant  not  to  request  restructurings
of the  bonds  at any  time  and  not to  request  any  new  money  loans  or other
financial  accommodations  from the holders  of the bonds.  The new money
bonds  would  thus  acquire  a more  senior  status.
In  addition,  the  Philippines  would  be  allowed  to  buyback  part  of  its
commercial  bank  debt  in  an  auction  to  be held  before  the  issue  of the  new
money  bonds.
offer  to  buy  back  $1.6  billion  of its  foreign  commercial  debt  for  $800  million,
implying  a price  of 50  cents,  and  that it  planned  to borrow  about $1 billion
through  the new money bonds. The announcement  also stated  that Philippines
expected  to receive  support  from the  World  Bank,  the  IMF  and  bilateral  donors
for  about  $710  million  for  the  buvback.  Banks  were  given  three  weeks  to  respond
to the offer.  The new-money  bond will not be finished  after the buyback is
completed,  which  happened  in  January  1990.32
Analysis
In terms of our notation, a - 43.9 (bank debt i, $12.5 billion and total
debt is $28.5 billion), q - 50, and I - 1. The status quo price given by our
model (exports of $11 billion) is q - 51.1, implying that a buyback price of
50 cents is about correct (a  bit on the low side). Setting C - $710 million and
L - $290 million, the analytical model predicts: N - $309 million, p - 51.8
cents, AD - $1,638 million and netAD - $529 million.
A  total of  $819  (710-290+399) million  will be  used  for  the buyback,
reducing  debt on net  by $529  million. In the  past, the Philippines  had refinanced
about half its interest payments. 2'  For $10.9 billion of remaining commercial
debt,  this comes  to $505 million of  expected new  money as  the alternative
scenario.  Adding the  extra new  money call of  $399  million gives a total  new  money
call of $904  million, quite close to  what the Philippines are  now seeking (given
the reduction in  the  base--from $12.5  billion to $10.9  billion--this corresponds
to a new money call of 8.3 percent).
5.3  Costa Rica
On  October  27  Costa Rica  announced that  it had  reached  agreement  in
principle with its commercial bank creditors on a debt reduction package (see
further the box).  The pathbreaking agreement was because of its treatment or
arrears.
Aralysis
It appears that the Costa Rica agreemeLit  handles the free-rider problem
through incentives appropriately. Even though no formal mechanism  is put  in
place to address free-riders,  the different treatment of the creditors which
will serve as an incentive scheme plus the (explicit) condonment by the IFIs,
of  arrears to the commercial banks  should be  sufficient to assure complete
participation.
In terms of our analytical framework  we have the following parameters: D
- $4.85 billion  (including arrears), commercial bank debt - $1.825 billion,
i.e., a  - .38,  q - .16 and C - 250 million. The low interest rate on the par
bonds implies approximately 35 cents present  value of debt relief per dollar of
face vai.ue.  The relative amount of collateral involved in the package of 6.25
27In our pricing model, a A  of 0.5 corresponds to  R - 13.7 percent when p
- 50 cents.33
Costa  Rica  Agreement:
The agreement includes the following elements.
Banks can tender their loans for cash at a price to be announced
by Costa Rica. Debt not tendered  will be converted into  bonds with a 6 1/4
percent annual coupon. On the past due interest (amounting in total to
approximately $325 million) not deemed extinguished through the buyback,
Coqta Rica will, as the buyback and the exchange take place, make a 20
percent down payment on the (written  down) back due interest and pay the
rest over 15 years with no grace period and at a spread of 13/16 over
money market rates.
Banks  tendering  60  percent  or  more  of  their  exposures  are
differentiated from the others. Their 6 1/4 percent par bonds will carry
a shorter maturity and one year interest guarantee, while their past due
interest  will carry a three  year rolling  guarantee.  Those banks tendering
less than 60 percent will receive no guarantees and their 6 1/4 percent
par bonds will carry a longer  maturity and grace.
Official support for the  program  will cover t-he  costs of the  buyback
and the interest  guarantee and is  expected to  amount to  some $250  million.
The official support is expected to be provided by the IMF, World Bank,
and to come from  bilateral sources, including  Japan, Taiwan, and the  U.S,
with possible funds coming from one or two European countries. According
to the President of Costa Rica, the agreement will reduce the country's
commercial debt  by about two-third  and its  interest  bill to the  commercial
banks by the same proportion, to $50 million.
percent par bonds, X, is approximately 12 percent.2 8 Setting L - 0, gives the
following  results:  netAD - $1.35  billion, debt reduction from  par bonds - $0.256
billion and the ex-post price is 58.6 cents, significantly above the price for
the buyback  (16 cents). The results correspond to the expected actual  debt
reduction  which is  buybacks  of 60  percent leading  to  $1095  million debt reduction
and exit bonds providing $219 million in debt relief, totalling $1314 million.
28Assume  that 60 percent of the banks offer 60 percent of their claims for
the buyback and 40 percent for the exit bond (banks A) and that the other 40
percent of the banks choose for 100  percent the exit bond  (banks B)  . Banks A
receive then on their exit bonds 1 year collateral for the debt part and 20
percent downpavment and 3 years collateral for the past due  interest part,
implying  an average collateralization of about 18 percent. Banks B receive only
20 percent downpayment on their past due interest, implying approximately 4
percent collateralization. The average for banks A and B is then 12 percent,34
6. Seniority, Prices and Buybacks
The importance of seniority  has  been pr  Lnted  out in the  discussion on exit
bonds. Changes in the degree of seniority can furthermore have an  important
impact on the amount of debt reduction that can be achieved in any deal and on
the net change in the value of claims of each seniority class. The debt value
function that has been used (equation 3) did not account for differences  in
seniority between commercial bank debt and other debt and was estimated using
the secondary  market price for commercial  bank debt  as the average price for  all
debt. If  commercial banks are the most  junior creditors, however, the secondary
market price would not reflect the average price for all debt, but the price of
the debt that is  serviced after all other creditors are serviced. The secondary
market price would then be below the average price for all debt.
A debt value function which accounts for this seniority structure can be
estimated. The procedure used was as follows. Going along the debt value curve,
the market value of debt accrues first to the most senior lenders, then to the
more junior lenders,  and then to  the  most  junior lenders. If  we assume that there
are only two  classes of debt, the market  value of the debt of the senior lenders
will be the value of debt given by the debt value curve for the face value of
their debt only. The market value of the junior creditors will be the market
value of total debt minus the market value of the debt of the senior lenders.
We can write this as:
V(Dj;a,,6)  - V(Di  +  D,;a,B) - V(D,;a,B)  (10)
where DJ  is the face value of junior debt, D,  is the face value of senior debt,
and where all market values depend on the parameters for the debt value curve
a  and  B.  Since  V(D 3 ;a,B) - p(D,;a,6)*D,, where  p(D,;Q,O)  is  the  predicted
(secondary  market) price for junior debt, this can also be written as:
p(DJ;a,B)  - [V(D 3 +  D,;a,o) - V(Ds:a,3)]/D,  (11)
A debt-value which allows for  seniority  can now be estimated by minimizing
the  sum  of squared  errors  between  predicted  and  observed  secondary market  prices,
[p(DJ;a,O)  - p]2, over the parameters a  and B. The result is as follows:
ln[p/(l-p)]  - 7.438 - 1.2134*ln(D/X)  (12)
The estimated coefficient for the slope is lower than with the no-seniority
curve (1.234 compar-d to 1.44), a reflection of the fact that the debt value
curve flattens out less rapidly when the debt-to-export ratio increases. Using
our previous example  (total debt $100 billion and exports $30 billion)  and
assuming that debt senior to commercial  bank claims is  $50 billion, we calculate
the average price of all debt, call it t, as 59.6 cents, the price of senior
debt, call it s, as 77.4 cents and the price of commercial bank debt p as 41.8
cents. Table 8 provides prices for alternative  combinations of total and senior
debt.
Prices for total debt are consistently above the prices predicted on the
basis of the no-seniority curve (see table 1). The elasticity of the price for
bank debt with respect to the total amount of debt is similar to before. The35
Table 8.  Prices for Alternative Levels  'f  Total and Senior Debt
(cents)
D  80  90  100  110  120
0  50  50  50  50  50
p (banks)  46.8  44.3  41.8  39.6  37.6
t  (total)  65.9  62.7  59.6  56.8  54.2
s (senior)  77.4  77.4  77.4  77.4  77.4
D  100  100  100  100  100
0  20  30  40  60  70
t  (total)  59.6  59.6  59.6  59.6  59.6
p (banks)  51.7  48.1  44.8  39.1  36.6
s (senior)  91.2  86.4  81.8  73.3  65.9
bottom panel can be used if there exist multiple seniority classes to evaluate
the value of debt in each class. For instance, the price of the $20 billion of
most senior  claims is  close to  par: 91.2  cents.  The price of the  next  most senior
$10 billion of claims is 76.8 cents.  29  Keeping total  debt fixed, the larger the
share of senior debt, the lower the price for the commercial bank claims.
Thble 9 provides information on the costs and benefits of buybacks done
at the ex-post price for commercial bank debt and accounting for the seniority
structure. The main difference compared to the no-seniority case is that the
ex-post price does not increase as much when a senior loan is used to buy back
debt. It is even possible that the price for commercial bank claims will fall
as a result of more senior debt, even if total debt is reduced. The net debt
reduction when domestic resources are used is larger than before as the price
of commercial bank debt rises less.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has presented a simple methodology for identifying the set of
best debt deals a country can bargain for  with its creditors when debt reduction
is included  in the set  of options.  The challenge  will now  be to identify the deal
which  is best  for  the  country  given  its  liquidity  versus  debt  reduction
preferences while at the same time  being acceptable to its creditors. This will
29This is derived as the total value of the $30 billion  in claims  ($30
billion *  86.4 cents) minus the value of the  $20 billion in claims ($20  billion
*  91.2 cents) divided by the face value ($10  billion).36
Table 9. Cost and Benefit of Buybacks
($  billion)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -..  ..-  . ...  - . . . . . . . . ..  - - - - - - - - - - . . . . .......-  - - - - - - - - .
Cash used  2  5  8
Source  Dom.  loan  dom.  loan  dom,  loan
AD  4.66  4.77  11.2  11.09  17.04  19.00
p(cents)  42.09  41.09  44.5  42.00  42.02  46.01
t(cents)  61.00  60.04  63.0  61.07  63.00  65.00
netAD  4.66  2.77  11.2  6.90  17.04  11.00
AV  0.88  1.90  2.27  4.78  7.65  3.69
D*Ap  1.12  0.10  2.73  0.22  4.31  0.35
Notes:  Buybacks take  place at the  ex-post  price p.  Computations are  based
on an initial debt of $100 billion and exports of $30 billion.
require  a  general  equilibrium  macroeconomic model  which  might  provide  the
necessary framework for  analyzing a country's investment, growth and repayments
behavior in a situation of a foreign credit constraint and a debt overhang.37
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